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Abstract
This article presents a theoretical framework with which to discuss how non-state modes of security 
governance evolve in the context of state failure and/or collapse. To address this issue, we present the 
logic of security markets, which assumes that the evolution of security governance by non-state groups in 
failed states is a function of both resource availability and the strategies that armed groups apply to extract 
resources from the civilian population. Axiomatically, we expect that in the short term the central purpose 
for the use of force is survival and achieving the ability to finance one’s capabilities to use force, although 
ultimately this also includes the seizure and control of territory. The main argument is that the changing 
competitive conditions in security markets – which we measure in terms of the total number of violent 
groups and their organizational design, size and strength – explain the rationales behind the decisions of 
armed groups either to use violence against the civilian population or to invest in the provision of security.
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Introduction
Security governance in zones of armed conflict and collapsed statehood seems like an antinomy. 
As a matter of fact, empirical evidence suggests that political disintegration and a lack of security 
guarantees frequently provide the rationale for local militias or rebel groups to pursue permanent 
strategies of violence, enrich themselves economically and thereby profit from insecurity. 
Accordingly, a vast literature emphasizes the destructive dimension of state failure and collective 
violence, but most studies do not recognize the potential evolutionary and alternative paths of 
security. As the rise of Somaliland or ‘Taylor-Land’ in Liberia during the 1990s has shown, the 
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breakdown of a state does not necessarily result in permanent insecurity. Rather, at least two logics 
of strategic action emerge, comprising distinct but potentially overlapping security dynamics: first, 
strategic insecurity, characterized by a shortage of armed protection, the emergence of non-state 
armed groups and a lack of collectively binding rules; second, strategic security, which fulfils 
political, economic and identity-based functions within a given territory and provides for various 
degrees of scope and inclusiveness by various actors, such as civil defence groups, external mili-
tary forces and private military companies.
While most studies within international relations theory, comparative politics and conflict 
research neglect the security activities of non-state actors in areas where state authority has col-
lapsed, we pay attention to the security dynamics that emerge in areas of collapsed statehood. For 
theoretical reasons, we assume that security can be provided without the state, or even its most 
rudimentary structures, and that the governance approach can, in turn, be usefully applied precisely 
to the processes of partially institutionalized macro-networks of strategic security that obtain in 
such cases. This idea builds upon approaches that interpret the violent activity of non-state armed 
actors as ‘new’ forms of governance (Duffield, 2001; Jackson, 2003; Keen, 2000; Reno, 2000), 
thereby moving away from state-centred perspectives of security and relying on a more promising 
approach to governance.
By linking the use of force (war-making) and the formation of governance (state-making), as 
proposed by Olson (1993) and Tilly (1985, 1990), scholars began to explore the idea that non-state 
armed groups might rather invest in the provision of political goods than pursue strategies of loot-
ing and violence against the civilian population (Kingston and Spears, 2004; Ottaway, 2002; Pegg, 
1998; Stokke, 2006; Tull, 2004). However, from the governance perspective, one central question 
still remains: How do these modes of security governance evolve in the context of state failure and/
or collapse? To address this question, we present the logic of security markets, which is based on 
economic approaches and peace and conflict theory. The concept of the ‘security market’ refers to 
the spatial and temporal coincidence of the demand for and supply of security in areas where the 
means of violence are not monopolized. Building on the arguments of both Charles Tilly (1985, 
1990) and Mancur Olson (1993), the logic of security markets assumes that the evolution of secu-
rity governance by non-state groups in failed states is a function of (1) resource availability and (2) 
strategies that armed groups apply in order to extract resources from the civilian population. 
Uncontrolled and unregulated security markets entail specific dynamics that explain the outbreak 
of violence, as well as the preferred form for the institutionalization of security governance, as a 
resource-allocation mechanism. Axiomatically, we assume that the central goals for the use of 
force are survival in the short term and the ability to finance one’s capabilities to use force. In the 
long term, though, they also include the seizure and control of territory.
The main argument is that the changing competitive conditions of security markets, which we 
measure as (1) the total number of violent groups and (2) their organizational design (size and 
strength), explain the rationale behind the decisions of armed groups either to use violence against 
the civilian population or to invest in the provision of security. By tracing the variance of these two 
variables, which we theorize as a function of open security markets in the wake of state collapse, 
we identify causal pathways to the formation of security governance extending beyond the state. 
Whereas state collapse opens the security market to non-state actors, who might enrich themselves 
and use violence in the absence of a sanctioning authority, in the long run the increase in the 
 number of actors and their organizational demands creates a resource-allocation problem, as well 
as additional incentives to use nonviolent means of extraction and invest in the provision of secu-
rity governance. These market-endogenous processes are accompanied by specific opportunity 
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structures such as natural resources, geographic conditions or the degree of territorial control and 
power vis-à-vis other armed groups, which additionally shape the formation of preferences for the 
use of force. While not only focusing on the rationale behind the decisions of violent groups as to 
whether to initiate and perpetuate violent conflict (greed vs. grievance), but also theorizing as to 
the conditions and mechanisms by which these groups turn to the provision of security, our research 
adds an important dimension to the study of violence and security in failed states.
The article starts by assessing the concept of security governance and the characteristics of the 
security provided by armed groups in the context of state failure. In the second section, this mode 
of coercive security provision is discussed from the perspective of governance and the public good. 
In the third section, we proceed by connecting this mode of coercive security theoretically with the 
logic of security markets. The fourth section goes on to discuss three opportunity structures that 
frame the competitive conditions of security markets. The article finally closes with a discussion 
of the relationship between security and governance in failed states.
Assessing the character of security in failed states
The scientific debate assessing the forms and qualities of security in failed states has created a 
flood of definitions and conceptual controversies. While the collapse of communism and the trans-
formation of the international security agenda at the end of the Cold War contributed to a broaden-
ing of the concept of security, ‘security governance’ became the magic term for denoting the 
changing security relations at different levels (international, national, subnational), between differ-
ent actors (state and non-state actors), and with regard to the management of various threats (e.g. 
civil war, trans-border refugee flows). Consequently, some authors link security governance to 
overall developments in the fragmentation of political authority between state and non-state actors, 
and thereby to a variety of forms of coordination, including regulation, collaboration and self-
regulation (see Krahmann, 2008). Other authors, in contrast, refer more explicitly to the function 
of governance structures as a means of managing social relations within civil wars (Öberg and 
Strøm, 2008: 9). Each perspective reflects changing forms and qualities of security, but has certain 
limitations regarding the assessment of the character of security in failed states. While the first 
assessment of security governance denotes the emergence of complex security structures in Europe 
and North America, and is thus not applicable to the processes of violence and the logics of non-
state action in the absence of a unifying political authority, the latter uses governance simply as a 
synonym for the formal and informal mechanisms of conflict resolution.
In contrast, we operate with a definition of governance that incorporates the regulatory struc-
tures and processes by which the security provided is intended as a collective good for a defined 
group of recipients. This definition emphasizes the specific strategies of militarily potent actors 
who invest in the establishment of monopolies in the use of force and advance processes of gover-
nance formation – that is, the establishment of institutionalized political and economic systems of 
rule. Within such security environments, one can assume the emergence of ‘new’ forms of gover-
nance within or across territorial boundaries (see Duffield, 2001; Jackson, 2003). As a result, we 
define security in a narrow sense, as the absence of threat to a predefined social group or, to put it 
differently, as a situation in which means applied with the purpose of maintaining protection 
against a specific group succeed in reducing the risk level with respect to existential threats.
Since security as a governance function must meet at least the criteria of a collective good 
(Risse and Lehmkuhl, forthcoming), the logic of its consumption should be discussed first: Which 
social groups actually consume security as a commodity and what territorial range does that 
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consumption assume? In other words, what sort of character does security take in failed states, in 
terms of inclusiveness and rivalry (Krahmann, 2008)? According to the theory of public goods, a 
pure public good is non-excludable and non-rival in consumption (Samuelson, 1954; Stiglitz, 
1999: 127–8). Strong states (see Rotberg, 2003) are assumed to monopolize the means of physical 
force (Weber, [1921] 1968). If militarily potent actors are/become able and willing to provide both 
internal security and protection against external threats through military and policing organiza-
tions, almost all citizens benefit from this arrangement as a public good (Rothschild, 1995; 
Sandler, 1993).
The territorial domain of the provision and the inclusiveness of the consumption are crucial to 
the evaluation of security as a public good. In failed states, the breakdown of state institutions usu-
ally leads to a societal fragmentation and the emergence of different violent groups that formulate 
political or economic claims. Organized violent groups might exist and challenge the state over 
different periods of time (Vreeland, 2008), but the complete collapse of state authority bears a 
special structural characteristic that marks that point in time to which the intrastate security 
dilemma (see Kaufman, 1996; Posen, 1993; Roe, 1999) becomes prevalent for the civilian popula-
tion and opens the security market for additional actors/suppliers. In the absence of an effective 
central government, very different groups within a state (ethnic, national, political, religious) are 
forced to provide their own security, or at least to build up the capacities to do so (see Roe, 1999). 
In other words, security becomes a club good, and the state, having lost its monopoly, has to com-
pete for shares in the market as one actor among many.
Moreover, in such a context, borders no longer define the sovereign sphere of state institutions. 
Violent groups partition the country’s territory or battle for access to strategically profitable areas. 
Transboundary formations (Callagy et al., 2001) may create new types of authority in which ethnic 
belonging or clientelism determines access to the security provided by violent groups.
We argue that one way to conceptualize types of security is to examine organizational processes 
of resource extraction and allocation (i.e. the interaction between violent groups and the civilian 
population) and the territorial expansion of security provision. Analytically, this approach com-
prises four key questions: (1) Who provides security? (2) How is this provision organized militar-
ily? (3) Is this provision territorially limited or does it expand over time? (4) What institutional 
means are applied in the interaction between the violent group and the civilian population?
Territoriality and the extent of consumption of specific protective measures are not only closely 
interconnected but also constitute the core elements for the identification of areas of strategic secu-
rity or insecurity. However, territorial control and the ability to reduce external threats do not in and 
of themselves constitute a seal of approval for the quality of security, since the control of the use 
of force can also be used for indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas, 2006) and systematic slaughter of 
the population. Though selective violence against civilians constitutes an act of communication, 
signalling the armed actor’s willingness and capability to control (Kalyvas, 2006: 26), in contrast, 
indiscriminate violence will take place under spatio-temporal conditions in which armed actors lack 
the information necessary to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ civilians – that is, between civil-
ians that are willing to collaborate or to defect (see Kalyvas, 2006: 150, 204). Accordingly, Kalyvas 
assumes that collaboration is mainly determined by effective control exercised by a capable armed 
actor: ‘Gaining control over an area brings collaboration, and losing control of an area brings much 
of that collaboration to an end’ (Kalyvas: 2006: 119). If we adopt this logic of violence, two pre-
sumptions become important: first, there must always be at least one armed actor, who intends to 
invest in security for a defined civilian population, rather than to exterminate or deport that popula-
tion (Kalyvas, 2006: 28–31); second, even civilians act strategically in that they seek to remain 
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alive in a secure environment (see also Weinstein, 2007). If this line of theoretical reasoning holds, 
civilians prefer to collaborate with the strongest armed group investing in protective means.
As long as rebels or local militias provide security only sporadically and in a territorially unde-
fined context, security remains a rival commodity that can be excluded from consumption (Brauer, 
1999: 6–7). Nevertheless, there are ways out of insecurity and the ‘protection screw’ (Mehlum 
et al., 2002: 448) that permit security as a good to once again move markedly from the private 
toward the public realm.
If we define security governance as the intentional provision of security for the collective good 
of a defined group of recipients of protection, one particular mode of security by coercion meets 
this criterion. Coercive security involves specific strategies on the part of militarily potent actors 
who invest in the establishment of monopolies in the use of force and thereby advance processes 
of governance formation. Primarily, dominant armed actors that are capable of imposing sanctions 
use their abilities to control territory and social relations (i.e. the civilian population) in order to 
build up internal and external protection systems. In addition, they no longer finance themselves 
by means of organized looting, but rather through institutionalized taxation systems. As long as 
these monopolists assure that the provision of security in their territory is not challenged or substi-
tuted by others, this system of rule can be treated as security governance. Typical examples are 
rebel groups such as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Southern Sudan or the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Furthermore, even local warlord factions in 
Afghanistan or Somalia have invested in the establishment of political and social regulatory struc-
tures that produce both a certain degree of mutual expectations and collectively binding decisions 
for a defined group.
The logic of security markets
Security and protection are not ordinary market commodities and differ in many ways from other 
consumer goods. While security can be seen as an aggregate state characterized by the absence of 
physical violence towards a defined group over time, protection encompasses all measures neces-
sary for the creation of security. Protection is thus the active process of providing security and the 
major asset traded on security markets. The competition in the provision of protection differs from 
classic economic concepts in terms of the factors of production, pricing mechanisms and the result-
ing quality of the market product (Skaperdas and Konrad, 2004). Private protection providers do not 
compete via pricing mechanisms, but rather through the use of violent means to gain control of 
territory and the revenues resulting from protection services. Moreover, it must be taken into account 
that the ownership of goods and services is not exchanged voluntarily, but is instead acquired by 
force (Elwert, 1999: 87). Unlike ordinary commodity markets, greater competition in the protection-
providers’ segment leads not to decreasing but rather to increasing prices for consumers of protec-
tion (Skaperdas, 2001: 174). At the same time, competition between non-state armed actors without 
a regulating central authority means that security dilemmas and arms races arise, which favour an 
increase in violence. Without any effective protection of their lives or property rights, large seg-
ments of the population are prevented from engaging in economically productive activities and are 
forced instead to invest in protecting themselves (Bates et al., 2002: 613). This need to invest in the 
means of violence reduces economic productivity and efficiency (Skaperdas, 2001: 187). Under 
conditions of overt violence, resources cannot be effectively distributed. Survival and the possibili-
ties of profiting from the provision of protection services thus depend on one’s relative ability to 
exercise violent control of resources and social relations where the state is no longer capable of 
doing so. Violence becomes a necessary – albeit not a sufficient – condition for the ability to 
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participate as a competitive player in the security market. Within this context, the self-defence 
groups that have arisen in Afghanistan to enable individuals to protect themselves against attacks 
from the Taliban and/or units of the Northern Alliance must be considered as security market par-
ticipants, just like better militarily equipped and hierarchically organized rebel groups.
The spectrum of market participants can be extended even further. In sub-Saharan Africa, this 
category includes not only rebel groups and local militias but also criminal cartels, traditional 
fighters like the Kamajors in Sierra Leone, and ad hoc groupings such as the so-called Area Boys 
in Lagos (Nigeria), who collect protection money on transportation routes and at weekly markets. 
Another critical group of actors that is contributing to the increased complexity of security markets 
and conflict structures in war, as well as in post-conflict and peacebuilding settings, is that of pri-
vate military companies (PMCs). Highly specialized PMCs not only offer a variety of services on 
today’s security markets, but also operate according to free-enterprise calculations. Internationally 
operating companies like Xe or DynCorp are the visible expression of a system that delegates 
selected security functions to commercial enterprises by states or private groups (see, for example, 
Avant, 2005; Leander, 2003; Musah, 2002; Singer, 2003). The involvement of this group of actors 
affects military power relationship and local conflict dynamics, as well as the calculations of state 
and non-state actors regarding whether to outsource certain forms of military activity to private 
specialists. These security dynamics turn out to have particularly serious consequences in Colombia 
and Iraq: external interventionists who support internal armed groups become themselves competi-
tors for resources and aggravate both the available informational asymmetries and the intensity of 
conflicts.
From the perspective of conflict theory, the problem underlying the increase in the number of 
armed actors is that reliable information about competitive groups and mutually binding security 
guarantees become increasingly indeterminate (see, for example, Cunningham, 2006; Walter, 
1997). The greater the number of potentially violent state and non-state parties to a conflict, and 
the more intense the competition becomes, the more significant are informational asymmetries and 
commitment problems. Such dynamics not only affect the conflict behaviour of armed actors but 
also heighten the vulnerability of societal groups (i.e. the civilian population) that are unable to 
provide for their own security by private means. Furthermore, the number of belligerents and their 
distribution of territorial control and military capabilities are also relevant to the relative power 
dynamics and expected outcomes of military strategies. As the application of bargaining power to 
civil contests shows (Butler and Gates, 2009), especially weaker non-state armed groups tend to 
invest in forms of unconventional warfare and engage in ongoing fighting against other parties. 
Given the asymmetric power dynamics and informational blind spots in failed states, we should 
expect armed groups to adopt strategies of insecurity through continued military attacks on both 
other armed actors and the civilian population. As a given group gains in terms of relative power 
and territorial control, armed groups can alter their security strategies accordingly.
In terms of economic theory, the market structures in the security realm can be described as an 
unusual form of monopolistic competition: each group establishes its own spatially delimited 
monopoly of protection, in which it must provide credible proof of its ability to provide security 
(Skaperdas, 2001: 187). The prices that can be demanded for protection services are thus contin-
gent on the number of armed actors, the degree of spatial separation between competitors, material 
opportunity structures and alternative options for action for the affected population (e.g. flight or 
the construction of self-defence units). More specifically, it can be expected that greater competi-
tion among armed actors will lead to greater investment in combat and increased information defi-
cits, which again aggravate achieving credible commitments (Skaperdas, 2002: 435).
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Economic models assume that decisionmakers – whether they are armed actors or potential 
entrepreneurs of governance – will consider the relative benefits of two forms of economic activity: 
investments in the production of civilian goods and services or investments in conflict-perpetuating 
means. Violent actors can thereby choose between the institutionalization of a rudimentary system 
of rule, one that guarantees ownership rights and organizes the interaction between providers and 
recipients of protection via a tax system, or a violence-mediated state of conflict, in which the civil-
ian population is used as spoils, or as an extractable resource to finance the capability of these 
actors for violent activity.
But, even under the conditions of armed contest between two or more violent groups, temporary 
forms of cooperation or the evolution, by agreement, of oligopolies of violence (Mehler, 2004) are 
possible. A prime example is the formation of a temporary alliance in Sierra Leone during the mid-
1990s between the government, the commercial security companies Gurkha Security Guards Ltd, 
Executive Outcomes and Sandline International, and the self-defence groups of the Kamajor mili-
tias, to fight the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Abdullah and Muana, 1998: 185).
Fundamentally, these considerations mean that armed groups can strategically choose between 
the provision of security and the maintenance of insecurity. The more promising military and eco-
nomic profits become, and the more uncertain a future under the conditions of peace appears 
(Fearon, 2004), the higher the value of insecurity strategies should become. In view of the struc-
tural characteristics of insecurity, a reverted shadow of the future can be assumed, particularly in 
areas of warlord competition (Skaperdas, 2002: 444). The prospect of the elimination of competi-
tors, and of the resulting greater profits, increases the value of violent conflict strategies in com-
parison to negotiated settlements. This has fatal consequences for the civilian population. First, the 
demand for protection services rises with the increasing degree of insecurity, though the free choice 
of protection-providers is greatly limited. Second, the risk increases that actors in the conflict will 
turn to strategies of indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas, 2006; Olsen, 2007; Weinstein, 2007; Wood, 
2008) and promote diffuse insecurity. Arbitrary violence and destruction of property are more 
probable in zones of strategic insecurity because of the asymmetric distribution of information and 
multiple material insecurities (Kalyvas, 2006; Skaperdas, 2001: 188; Weinstein, 2007). The ability 
to cause either security or insecurity (or both) becomes a political and economic resource, and 
hence an alternative source of power. As a result, the price for protection services increases with 
the military capabilities of potent armed actors (Mehlum et al., 2002). Theoretically, the production 
of (in)security is thus immediately tied to the logic of violence and resource extraction.
In the context of an increasing tendency toward fragmentation of the actors’ spectrum, as well 
as the associated implications for the forms of security, the concept of the security market describes 
the structure and composition of the supply-and-demand side in the provision of protection com-
modities and its temporal and spatial coincidence in areas where the provision is not monopolized. 
While a constant demand for security can be assumed on these markets, the supply varies in degree 
and over time. Similar to corporations on regular markets, violent groups calculate the profit mar-
gins of their investments in the supply of security – that is, whether to invest in the production of a 
secure environment (areas of strategic security) or to perpetuate the violent appropriation of 
resources. The inherent logic of security markets is described in Figure 1.
The breakdown of state institutions and the effective monopoly of violence at t0 have two 
major implications: It leads to a fragmentation of the range of actors that formulate political and/
or economic claims, and it opens up the security market to non-state actors, owing to the absence 
of an effective monopoly of violence. We expect an increase in the total number of violent 
groups and more violence in the direct aftermath of state failure. Owing to the absence of a 
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sanctioning monopoly of violence, the incentives are high to enter the market and make use of 
freely accessible resources. In particular, escalation periods tend to be characterized by an appar-
ently arbitrary plundering effort and the use of violence against civilians. These dynamics have 
two implications: First, the lower the profits get for individual violent groups, the higher the 
incentives to reduce the number of competitors. Violent groups are expected to engage in more 
battles as the number of local market participants increases. Second, more military resources are 
needed to defeat enemies, so the groups shift all of their resources to their military wings. The 
military organization increases in size. In accordance with such an increase, the cost of maintain-
ing organizational capacities also increases. Thus, there is an incentive for a more efficient 
resource allocation, since the formerly applied strategies of resource extraction may not cover 
the expenses. At t1 we expect an increase in the probability of coercive modes of governance, in 
which protection is offered and a rudimentary taxation system is implemented. As a result, rov-
ing bandits may decide to become stationary (Olson, 1993).
This way of theorizing the conditions for the institutionalizing of the provision of security as a 
public good is closely related to Olson’s ideas (1993) and to what Charles Tilly (1985: 181) con-
ceptualized as the four main activities the agents of states carry out. To guarantee that security or 
the use of force is not substituted by competitors, violent groups in fact aim to eliminate or neutral-
ize their rivals outside (war-making) and inside (state-making) in ‘the territories, in which they 
have clear and continuous priority, as wielders of force’ (Tilly, 1985: 181). The monopolistic status 
that accompanies these activities allows them to provide security as a public good inside this terri-
tory (protection). To acquire the means for carrying out these activities, they extract resources from 
their client population through a taxation system (extraction). The evolution of nation-states is 
ultimately said to be a function of the mutual reinforcement of these activities. However, while 
Olson (1993) did not specify the precise switching point at which roving bandits become stationary 
(Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen, 2003: 257), in Tilly’s (1985: 172) account the growth of state 
organizations proceeds rather randomly and is said to be a path-dependent function of the demand 














Figure 1. The logic of security markets over time
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on May 12, 2015sdi.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Branovic´ and Chojnacki:  The logic of security markets 561
necessarily apply to the civil wars of the 21st century (Sørensen, 2001), we follow this idea insofar 
as maintenance costs do in fact lead to an incentive to organize a more efficient extraction of 
resources, since a greater organization acquires greater costs. Thus, the logic of security markets 
does not necessarily entail an evolutionary logic to state-making, in that the types of security dis-
cussed here might not be embryonic to statehood – although they can be. In contrast to Tilly, we 
assume that there is no path dependency between organizational growth and state-making. 
Authority by violent groups can be temporally and spatially limited and is by no means always 
stable. The stability and the institutional development of coercive modes of governance depend 
instead on the time horizon (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1974). If a violent organization expects to 
stay in control indefinitely, then the optimal strategy is to tax appropriately and not to confiscate 
everything produced by the civilian population.
If security is ranked in a hierarchy of public good as the central precondition for a functioning 
political order (Konrad and Skaperdas, 2005; Rotberg, 2003), which is necessary to obtain positive 
effects in other realms, it follows that its rudimentary institutionalization can be restricted to the 
establishment of a system of protection and taxation. This implies formal and informal institutions 
that organize the monetary transactions between the provider and the recipients of protection, as 
well as an organizational framework that guarantees territorial integrity towards third parties. From 
a neo-institutionalist perspective this process gives rise to security expectations on the part of both 
the civilian population and the dominant armed actor. The civilian population can assume, on the 
basis of information regarding the military capacities of the protection-provider, a certain degree 
of effectiveness – that is, the protection-provider in fact appears as a reliable security monopolist 
in the eyes of the population (Weinstein, 2007: 169–70). Moreover, it is assumed that the produc-
tivity of the civilian population will increase owing to the perceived territorial security, since more 
time and resources can be invested in production than in self-protective means. In turn, the armed 
organization achieves reliability regarding a regular income, which it obtains through the institu-
tionalized taxation system. In this way, armed groups not only secure their own organizational 
structures but also take into account future investment decisions, which can therefore take on the 
quality of a public good – if the investments are made through sustainable economic means of 
production (Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen, 2003; Olson, 1993). To sum up, the success or stabil-
ity of such non-state control systems depends on the quality of formal and informal rules of deci-
sionmaking related to the system of protection and taxation, the credibility of deterrence of internal 
and external military challengers, and the reliability of agreements between the military leadership 
and the civilian population. Over time, however, even violent actors have to engage in legitimatiz-
ing processes. Theoretically, it can be assumed that coercive modes of security governance tend to 
establish an endogenous or exogenous frame of stabilization. Related to the former, an expansion 
of public-related services into other sectors (e.g. finance, health, education) characterizes the 
development of quasi-state structures (as, for example, in Somaliland) that require a minimum of 
output legitimacy (Bakonyi and Stuvøy, 2005). In the case of exogenous stabilization, one has to 
consider the benefits that accompany statehood (e.g. licensing, credits, development aid). From 
this point of view, it is not surprising that coercive modes of security governance may possibly 
transform into statehood (as occurred in Liberia with Charles Taylor) and make use of externally 
guaranteed sovereignty.
Security by opportunity
The dynamics described above are endogenous to the market, as they capture the quantity and quality 
of the constitutive market participants only. Yet, just as market conditions such as size of the market, 
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sales prospects and sales volume frame the supply strategies of corporations in relation to product 
markets, so do specific opportunity structures enable and restrict the willingness to act within the 
domain of security markets. From a methodological perspective, opportunity structures should be 
considered as triggering, intervening or conditional variables that need additional elaboration.
Theoretically, opportunity structures encompass the conditions upon which actors formulate 
preferences, make decisions and act (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Siverson and Starr, 1991). In the 
research on the causes of war, they have often been used as explanatory factors for the probability 
of the outbreak of both internal and international warfare. However, both the twin concepts of 
opportunity and willingness developed by Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr (Most and Starr, 1980; 
Starr, 1978) and the opportunity model of the World Bank group around Paul Collier (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 1998, 2004) are oriented toward the relatively static boundary conditions of methodologi-
cal nationalism (including borders, number of neighbouring states or primary goods exports). The 
approach developed by the World Bank group relates the motivation of armed actors primarily to the 
motive greed and the relative share of the export of primary goods to the overall volume of export 
(see the critique by Cramer, 2002; Fearon, 2005). Moreover, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) see struc-
tures of opportunity as pre-existing factors in conflicts between rebel groups and governments, 
which primarily reflect the conditions that increase the risk of the outbreak of civil wars involving 
two conflicting parties. But, precisely under the conditions experienced by failing states, opportu-
nity structures and the configuration of actors may shift both in time and in space. Resources may 
be completely exploited, the emergence of splinter factions and/or the intervention of external actors 
may change the balance of power between conflicting parties, or one of these parties may over time 
establish a dominant position within a defined territory. The term ‘opportunity structures’ is there-
fore used as a broad category, encompassing the material, territorial and process-related options 
actors find under particular conditions of time and space. It refers both to incentive structures favour-
ing the perpetuation of violence and to those factors that promote new modes of governance.
Economic opportunities
Basically, material structures of opportunity refer to all available resources that can be extracted and 
thus used to guarantee one’s capability to exert force. Areas of strategic insecurity are therefore most 
likely to arise in resource-rich areas: the greater the wealth of resources, the higher the probability 
that new entrepreneurs of violence will appear on the security market and compete with one another. 
Consequently, the incentive structure to continuously apply military force and to produce insecurity 
will be greater. The insight that the type of resource itself affects the risks of the occurrence and 
perpetuation of organized violence is even more fundamental. Empirical studies reveal that the effect 
of diamonds and oil is highly significant, while that of agricultural goods, by contrast, is hardly 
significant at all (Fearon, 2005; Lujala et al., 2005; Ross, 2004). The extraction practice of guarantee-
ing one’s own freedom to act by mining mineral resources leads to a different logic of security and 
different constraints than does the looting of the civilian population. While the extraction of natural 
resources primarily poses logistical challenges, such as the securing of extraction, storage sites and 
transportation routes, the taxation of humanitarian aid and looting of the civilian population tend to 
be carried out in a more ad hoc and often uncoordinated manner.
Resources are also a critical quantum for the survival of the civilian population and various 
types of armed organizations. Particularly, specialized entrepreneurs of violence make profits from 
lootings and protection services, thus jacking up the ‘protection screw’ (Mehlum et al., 2002). 
Looting has a dual function here: first, it enables better mobilization of resources to permit the 
financing of combat; second, it permits expenditures for the pay to combatants to be reduced (see, 
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for example, Azam, 2006). In the long run, however, the looting of the civilian population also 
raises two problems: first, the number of competitive armed groups can increase over time, and 
hence too the number of violent incidents; second, this situation permits no phases of regeneration 
for the population, during which they can produce new resources to loot. Both problems imply a 
marginal profitability of looting over time.
By contrast, in areas with only weakly organized armed groups, the civilian population can, 
theoretically, be considered as a freely accessible resource, and as such is constantly endangered 
by overlooting (Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen, 2003: 257). In situations of competition between 
armed groups, these conditions intensify. Under conditions of incomplete information, armed 
groups most likely come to no mutual agreement as to where and to what degree looting is to be 
undertaken. Hence, the probability of overlooting increases. A sustainable practice of extraction, 
which allows for regeneration phases for the population, can hardly be expected in situations in 
which armed groups are highly fractured into splinter factions and in which there is a high demand 
for resources and specific organizational structures.
These issues are closely related to organizational dynamics. For every armed group, an increased 
degree of organization implies higher maintenance expenses and hence an increased demand for 
resources. The marginal profitability of looting can therefore occur in a dual manner: first, via 
overlooting as described above, by which non-coordinated looting and the potential increase of 
armed groups result in overplundering and the loss of potential profits; and, second, when profits 
no longer cover the regular expenditures of maintenance. According to economic theory, the posi-
tive, beneficial effects for the civilian population increase with a minimum of security, since it can 
invest in production rather than protection services. A well-established armed organization can 
therefore seize a dominant position in the course of the conflict and take the opportunity to share 
in the profits of increased productivity through taxation of protection in a defined territory.
Geographic opportunities
Recent civil war research has discovered the ‘geography of war’. Studies show that topographical 
variables like forests and mountains not only affect the manner in which internal conflicts are car-
ried out, but are also important in determining the prospect of winning a battle or the war (Buhaug 
and Gates, 2002; Buhaug and Rød, 2006; Gates, 2002). At the same time, geography also limits the 
number of potential violent actors and provides information for an understanding of organizational 
logics of violent groups. Greater distance between contending groups affects the probability that 
competing violent groups will emerge (Gates, 2002: 127).
Particularly linked to geographic opportunity structures is the concentration of resources, which 
affects the possibilities of carrying out certain forms of violent control and making profits from 
resource extraction. One has to bear in mind that natural resources differ considerably in their con-
centration and location (see, for example, Le Billon, 2001; Ross, 2004). Centralized resources such 
as petroleum and easily accessible mines are considerably easier to monitor than resources that are 
widely dispersed geographically, such as opium plantations, alluvial diamonds or tropical forests. 
A critical aspect is the proximity to the headquarters of a rebel group or the capital of the state. It 
has been demonstrated empirically that natural resources that are located near the capital of a coun-
try can be monitored more easily by the sitting government than more remote extraction sites (Le 
Billon, 2001). The reverse is equally the case: the further an extraction site is away from the state 
centre, the easier it is for non-state armed groups to appropriate, and the more probable it will be 
that violent conflicts, and hence areas of strategic insecurity, arise. Accordingly, geographic oppor-
tunities influence the size and dispersion of violent groups in very different ways. They determine 
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to what degree violent groups can rely on direct extraction means, such as the plunder of agricul-
tural products during harvesting time, or whether indirect means of extraction (taxation of interna-
tional relief supplies or protection duties on transportation routes) are applied.
Conflict-related opportunities
Conflict-related opportunities refer to characteristics of the course of conflict, such as its intensity 
or its duration, and are critical process conditions for the evolution of security governance. Through 
defeating their enemies or conquering major parts of the conflict zone, armed groups may achieve 
a dominant position during a conflict and come closer to the ability to monopolize the use of force. 
Extended conflicts can in turn provoke external military interventions by third parties (Regan, 
2000), which might either change the military balance or even imply an externally induced institu-
tionalization of a security order of another kind (e.g. protectorates, peacemaking missions, etc.). 
Since rebel groups are said to have a decreased probability of winning wars after UN interventions, 
as the likelihood of a treaty or truce increases (De Rouen and Sobek, 2004), violent groups might 
seek to increase their legitimacy and refrain from looting and plundering.
Civil wars in which multiple actors have to approve a settlement tend to be longer, because of a 
low degree of willingness to accept agreements, greater information asymmetries, and shifting 
incentives and alliances (Cunningham, 2006). The duration of violent conflicts and the number of 
participating actors (veto players) are thus of critical importance, since they tend to increase the 
likelihood of (1) violence against civilians (looting) and (2) overlooting. The effect of the active 
number of actors is underestimated in recent civil war studies (Azam and Hoeffler, 2002; Eck and 
Hultman, 2007; Kalyvas, 2006; Valentino et al., 2004; Weinstein, 2007). This literature remains 
state-centred and focuses on conflicts between governments and rebel groups. However, failed 
states are often not characterized by a dyadic conflict structure (state vs rebel group). Instead, the 
state’s control of the use of force is severely limited or has broken down, and several entrepreneurs 
of violence compete as providers of security or perpetrators of insecurity. Assuming a multiple-
actor setting, a decrease in the number of violent groups should, over time, imply an increase in the 
relative power position and the organizational size of other actors, which in turn should positively 
affect the probability of coercive security. The function of violence again changes in such situa-
tions. Whereas fighting and battles are used to signal one’s own military capabilities and gather 
information about the adversary (Powell, 2004; Wagner, 2000), the strategic use of violence might 
switch to the defence of territory and attacks against enemies who attempt to conquer already con-
trolled areas.
In sum, conflict-related opportunities point to the fact that the conflict setting (duration, domi-
nation, intervention) and the available resources (long-run negative externalities of plundering) 
change over time. This confronts violent groups with an incentive to invest in the buildup of areas 
of strategic security rather than perpetuate strategies of plundering and looting.
Conclusion
As this article has argued, there is an inherent logic to security markets that predicts the emergence 
of security governance in failed states. The variance of the overall number of armed groups and 
their organizational capacity explains the tendency either to use violence against the civilian popu-
lation for resource-allocation purposes or to invest in the provision of security by establishing 
coercive modes of governance. State collapse should be understood as a specific structural charac-
teristic, since it opens the security market up to non-state actors, who might enrich themselves and 
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use violence in the absence of a sanctioning authority. In the long run, the increase in the number 
of actors and their organizational demands creates a problem in resource allocation, as well as 
additional incentives to use nonviolent means of extraction and invest in the provision of security 
governance. Changing geographical, economic and conflict-related structures of opportunity frame 
this endogenous market logic. The establishing of governance should be expected as a preferred 
strategy for exerting control over a defined territory and a defined population under certain mate-
rial conditions (i.e. within economically valuable territories), in order to overcome or balance the 
risks of survival and negative economic effects (overplundering) in zones of permanent violence. 
The formation of security structures may fail or become the unmaking of governance, if armed 
groups refrain from providing both a minimum of internal security and deterrence from external 
threats, resources are limited or become scarce, and support within the armed group or population 
decreases. While Somaliland (since 1991) and Puntland (since 1998) clearly represent alternative 
forms of security governance beyond the state, partially institutionalized macro-networks of stra-
tegic security such as ‘Taylor-Land’ in Liberia (1991–6), ‘Nkunda-Land’ (2004–9) in the Eastern 
Congo or the Islamic Courts in Somalia (1999–2006) stand for the attempt to invest in the provi-
sion of security within failed states and for the failure or transitional character of such security 
arrangements.
The potential paths of governance formation discussed here suggest, first, that the provision of 
security as a governance service can be provided by a variety of non-state groups without the state; 
second, that it may be organized on the basis of rudimentary regulatory structures and processes; and, 
third, that it varies in its effective range (territoriality and consumption). We are well aware, however, 
that the building of security governance or ‘rebel governments’ (Weinstein, 2007: 164) may also 
include other opportunity structures, such as shared identities and social institutions. For example, 
civilian involvement in the building of governance may greatly enhance armed groups’ responsive-
ness to the needs of civilian populations: for northern and northwestern Liberia, Amos Sawyer (2005) 
describes how the Poro authority and armed rule was used to build governance structures and to inte-
grate armed groups into local power structures, while at the same time restricting their military actions.
Conceptually, the considerations presented here indicate conscious points of reference on the 
concept of markets of violence (Elwert, 1999), and on what Pegg (1998), Lynch (2004), Berg (2007) 
and others have called de facto states, or what Kingston and Spears (2004) term states-within-states, 
and Kolstø (2006) terms unrecognized quasi-states. Against this backdrop, Jutta Bakonyi and Kirsti 
Stuvøy (2005, 2006) distinguish between two ideal types of non-state orders of violence: warlord 
configurations, which constitute an only weakly institutionalized type of order, are not territorially 
consolidated and hardly have any organizational apparatus, and quasi-states, which are best charac-
terized as highly institutionalized orders of violence akin to basic functions of the state, but that may 
not enjoy formal recognition by the international community (such as Somaliland). Nonetheless, 
quasi-states have monopolized the provision of security within their territorial areas of influence and 
control parts of a territory, together with its economic resources (see Bakonyi and Stuvøy, 2006: 
41–2). Both variants ultimately indicate the co-existence of alternative structures of order in failed 
states. Yet, that does not mean that the state loses its significance entirely in such areas. It may very 
well remain the central frame of reference for non-state armed actors and also fits well into the logic 
of structures of opportunity. The state apparatus and the perspective of international recognition 
remain important resources, both internally (political legitimacy, advantages over political rivals) and 
externally (e.g. in the form of international financial aid or access to international assistance). It can 
therefore be assumed that opportunity structures such as the form of a state and the norm of sover-
eignty will in the future continue to determine the options for action of (some) private armed groups.
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